Bandra-Worli Sea Link

Lessons to learn from

The Bandra-Worli Sea Link presents an interesting case-study of infrastructure planning and management issues, in line with our discussion on the Montreal Olympic Stadium. The sea-link was originally conceived of in 1960s, but received a green signal only in 1999, after studies were conducted by the Central Road Research Institute and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA). The Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) was appointed as the nodal agency for the project in 1999. The MSRDC awarded the project to the Hindustan Construction Company (HCC), but only to see a series of failure in meeting deadlines. The initial deadline was December 2004 which was later revised to December 2007 and then to December 2008. Actual work, however, did not commence until January 2005 when the Supreme Court gave the project go-ahead. The consequences of haphazard planning and scheduling, as was evident in the Montreal case, are reflected in this example as well.

The MSRDC changed consultants in 2003 and gave entry to Egypt-based Dar Consultants. The new party brought in tremendous design changes which escalated the costs by four times (Rs 4.4 billion to Rs 16.34 billion). HCC is said to have lost about Rs 4 billion due to these changes. Thus we see the role of designing and its crucial place in the overall implementation of an infrastructure project.

In April 2009, days before the completion of the project, three sets of sub-contractors threatened to pull out due to issues with the consultants. One of them, the Roman Tarmant Ltd., was about to obtain a contract for Polymer Modified Bitumen (PMB) surfacing to provide a water-proof road. However, the company backed out due to unreasonable conditions on warranty period. The wide spectrum of players involved in an infrastructure project and the corresponding human management that the size of such projects calls for is evident in this case.

A part of the rise in costs was due to the interests on borrowings and payment to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai for a casting yard, an instance that shows how economic factors can equally inflect a project just as any other. Also to be noted is the fact that around 4000 workers and 150 engineers from India as well as China, Egypt, Canada, Switzerland and Britain are said to have participated in the project, which would have demanded micro-level cultural integration, a pointed that was highlighted in the class.

A few local issues like environmental concerns and issues pertaining to the fishermen, also surfaced during construction, which, though parochial, could have impeded the completion of the project. The Bandra-Worli sea-link, however, managed to brush such concerns aside with active political support from the state. To epilogue, this project presents many of the nuances involved in infrastructure planning and shows the amount of meticulousness that the task calls for.

Sources:
Indian Infrastructure, July 2009
"Bandra-Worli Sea Link: A Traveller's Delight", The Economic Times, June 30, 2009
(http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Economy/Infrastructure/Bandra-Worli-sea-link-A-travellers-delight-/articleshow/4718082.cms)
Official Website (http://www.bandraworlisealink.com/)