The paper by Geraldine Dalton discusses the causes for failure of the Cochabamba project where private sector financing was used as a tool to carry out the project. While, the issues which led to the project being scrapped such as the water tariff hikes, terms of privatization, etc were discussed by the author, the passing of Law 2029 boggles my mind. According to Law 2029, the water was made into a State commodity and was exclusively licensed over to ADT. This not only meant people cant draw water from their own private wells, but also cannot collect rain water without a license. In September of 2001, the residents of Cochabamba took control of SEMAPA through La Coordinadora (La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la Vida). The new SEMAPA has so far reduced the water tariffs, built a community water tank in Alto Cochabamba, installed 800 new water connections and connected 400 communities abandoned by the old company to water supply network. I have included an excerpt from the paper regarding the newly formed SEMAPA.
As an institution, SEMAPA is a model participatory organisation. The company is run with full support and inclusion of its workers and its community rather than by ‘corrupt politicians’ (Shultz, 2001, Harden, 2001). This is achieved through the institutional focus of neighborhood citizens meetings that use local knowledge to prioritize local needs and to help solve water supply problems. Similarly, public hearings are used to define how SEMAPA should develop, and on a weekly TV show the SEMAPA Director Dr. Jorge Alvarado, answers the public's questions and hears their concerns (Barlow, 2001). This approach enables SEMAPA to optimize the financial resources available to it in order to meet social objectives in water provision and maintain and popular support for its operations.There are some constraints on SEMAPA’s continued success. Despite popular support, its affiliation with La Coordinadora has ruled out support from Cochabamba’s political and business elite. They have boycotted the organisation and refused to pay water tariffs (Harden,2001). Apart from loss of revenue, lack of support from this community is detracts from 16 SEMAPA’s institutional credibility. Although progress has been made, Cochabamba’s problems have not been solved. Jorge Cuba, a Bolivian journalist has noted that the city has no more than 5 hours of water a day and only 40% of the farmers in surrounding areas have access to clean water (Cuba, 2000). The true measure of ‘new’ SEMAPA’s potential as an organisation is its capacity to raise finance and address future as well as current water requirements.
Source: Private sector finance for water sector infrastructure: what does Cochabamba tell us about using this instrument? by Geraldine Dalton, Occasional Paper No 37, Water Issues Study Group, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, September 2001
As an institution, SEMAPA is a model participatory organisation. The company is run with full support and inclusion of its workers and its community rather than by ‘corrupt politicians’ (Shultz, 2001, Harden, 2001). This is achieved through the institutional focus of neighborhood citizens meetings that use local knowledge to prioritize local needs and to help solve water supply problems. Similarly, public hearings are used to define how SEMAPA should develop, and on a weekly TV show the SEMAPA Director Dr. Jorge Alvarado, answers the public's questions and hears their concerns (Barlow, 2001). This approach enables SEMAPA to optimize the financial resources available to it in order to meet social objectives in water provision and maintain and popular support for its operations.There are some constraints on SEMAPA’s continued success. Despite popular support, its affiliation with La Coordinadora has ruled out support from Cochabamba’s political and business elite. They have boycotted the organisation and refused to pay water tariffs (Harden,2001). Apart from loss of revenue, lack of support from this community is detracts from 16 SEMAPA’s institutional credibility. Although progress has been made, Cochabamba’s problems have not been solved. Jorge Cuba, a Bolivian journalist has noted that the city has no more than 5 hours of water a day and only 40% of the farmers in surrounding areas have access to clean water (Cuba, 2000). The true measure of ‘new’ SEMAPA’s potential as an organisation is its capacity to raise finance and address future as well as current water requirements.
Source: Private sector finance for water sector infrastructure: what does Cochabamba tell us about using this instrument? by Geraldine Dalton, Occasional Paper No 37, Water Issues Study Group, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, September 2001
3 comments:
Only 1,200 new connections? If I remember right, weren't there far more houses that needed to be connected? That's barely going to have any impact at all.
Or by communities, is the author referring to a group of households? Please do clear this doubt up.
Varun, the updated post should clarify your doubt. The new SEMAPA not only installed 800 new connections but also connected 400 communities (clusters of lower income group abandoned by the previous provided)to the water supply network.
Ah, that makes more sense. But could you go into detail about the size of these 400 communities (number of households, etc)? It would be useful in getting a representative idea of how large the water requirements are at present.
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